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Regulatory Agencies and Courts in the 
South: The Overlaps in Colombian Water 
Regulation
Julián Daniel López-Murcia 
Abstract: How can we explain the emergence and evolvement of the over-
laps between the Colombian Water and Sanitation Regulatory Commission 
(CRA) and the Constitutional Court? This paper shows the dominant litera-
ture’s limitations in explaining these overlaps. By contrast, I argue that the 
“regulatory enterprise” approach developed by Tony Prosser (2010) and the 
theory of “institutional isomorphism” explained by DiMaggio and Powell 
(1991) are better equipped to offer plausible explanations. Moreover, I hy-
pothesize that the lack of understanding regarding the differences between 
the role of a regulatory agency in developed countries and the role of a regu-
latory agency in Colombia is critical in these overlaps. The specific condi-
tions that determine these differences are a precarious legislature, a “thick” 
constitution that includes several social rights, and an activist judicial en-
forcement of these rights. This qualitative research does not allow for gener-
alizable conclusions. However, the intention of this study is to provide in-
sights into the role and specific challenges for a regulatory agency in devel-
oping countries. Furthermore, this case study seeks to demonstrate that 
regulation researchers must focus on the political context to develop tools 
appropriate for evaluating regulatory agencies outside the developed world. 
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Introduction 
The core of this paper is a case study of the overlaps between the Colombi-
an Water and Sanitation Regulatory Commission (CRA – Comisión de Reg-
ulación de Agua Potable y Saneamiento Básico de la República de Colom-
bia) and the Colombian Constitutional Court regarding water service dis-
connection issues. Based on the Public Utilities Statute (Law 142 of 1994), 
the CRA has issued a number of regulations that oblige providers to discon-
nect water service when there is no payment during a three-month period. 
However, typical claims brought before the Constitutional Court have been 
against a provider by a single petitioner arguing that the provider deprived 
him or her of the minimum essential level of water because of failure to pay. 
In the majority of these cases (mainly related to low-income families), the 
Court has ruled in favor of the claimant based on General Comment 15 of 
the UN Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights. These rulings 
have been reproduced by a number of judges around the country. The 
CRA’s regulations are not under the control of the Constitutional Court, but 
rather the judicial review of the Council of State (Colombia’s highest con-
tentious administrative tribunal). These overlaps have affected not only 
thousands of poor families who have to make a claim before a judge to 
protect their right to water, but also water providers – who have not re-
ceived clear directions regarding water service disconnection issues.  
The overall question posed by the study is as follows: How can we ex-
plain the emergence and evolvement of the overlaps between the CRA and 
the Constitutional Court?  
To respond to this question, this paper mainly draws on the notions of 
“regulatory rationales,” “regulatory enterprise” and “institutional isomor-
phism.” Regarding regulatory rationales, it is possible to identify perspec-
tives both against and in favor of their plurality. These perspectives are also 
relevant with regard to the understanding of the regulator’s role and legiti-
macy (see Majone 1999; Dubash and Morgan 2012). For instance, Majone 
(1997) rejects any other regulatory rationale different from “economic effi-
ciency.” He states that a “nonmajoritarian body” would lose its legitimacy if 
it were to go beyond this rationale (Majone 1997). In contrast, Prosser 
(2006) states that this traditional public-interest explanation of regulation as 
a “second best” to market allocation does not properly explain current regu-
latory practice. He identifies four regulatory rationales: “efficiency and con-
sumer choice,” “human rights,” “social solidarity” and “participation and 
deliberation” (Prosser 2010). Furthermore, regulatory processes should not 
be seen as “the application of rules laid down by a principal for the regulato-
ry agent to enforce,” but as a regulatory enterprise with “different levels of 
government” (Prosser 2010: 8). Finally, institutional isomorphism is a notion 
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widely used to explain the diffusion of institutional designs and regulatory 
instruments (see Gilardi 2002, 2005; Thatcher 2002, 2007; Baldwin, Cave, 
and Lodge 2012). This is based on the concept of isomorphism described by 
Hawley as a “constraining process that forces one unit in a population to 
resemble other units that face the same set of environmental conditions” 
(DiMaggio and Powell 1991: 66).  
This qualitative research does not allow for generalizable conclusions. 
Nonetheless, the intention of this paper is to provide valuable insights into 
the particular role and challenges for a regulatory agency in developing 
countries (or even emerging economies) where the legislature functions 
badly, there is a “thick” constitution that includes several social rights, and 
activist judicial enforcement – such as in Colombia. Regarding the creation 
of independent regulatory agencies (see Jordana and Ramió 2010; Thatcher 
2002, 2007; Gilardi 2002, 2005) and thick constitutions (see Sunstein 2001; 
Scheppele 2005; Langford 2009; Landau and López 2009), Colombia is not 
an isolated example. Similar conditions can be found in Hungary, Bulgaria 
and the Czech Republic in Eastern Europe; Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Peru 
and Venezuela in Latin America; and to some extent India in Asia. Howev-
er, the activist judicial enforcement of social rights developed by the Co-
lombian Constitutional Court is particularly higher than the judicial en-
forcement in these countries (Landau 2012). 
This paper is organized as follows: Part 1 provides an explanation of 
the notions used here (i.e., regulatory enterprise, regulatory rationales and 
institutional isomorphism) to analyze this case study instead of the specific 
literature on the relationship between regulatory agencies and courts or 
other more dominant approaches such as capture theories. Part 2, according 
to Prosser’s approach, presents the “interinstitutional mapping” and “nor-
mative mapping” of the CRA and the Constitutional Court. Part 3 describes 
the origin and evolvement of the overlaps between CRA regulations and the 
Constitutional Court rulings regarding water service disconnection issues. 
Part 4 applies Prosser’s notions and the institutional isomorphism concept 
to the Colombian case and explains why (a) there are overlaps between regu-
latory rationales, (b) the CRA’s regulatory rationale is the product of differ-
ent episodes of institutional isomorphism, and (c) the CRA’s position re-
garding these overlaps is not sensible (even though the dominant theories 
on the regulator’s role would find it appropriate) given Colombia’s institu-
tional context. Part 5 concludes by suggesting that the role of a regulatory 
agency is not the same in developed countries as it is in Colombia, because 
of the radical differences in the configuration of political institutions.
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1 Exploring beyond the Limitations of the  
Dominant Literature on the Regulator’s Role
Bearing in mind the difficulties in using the specific literature on the relation 
between regulatory agencies and courts, this case study should be ap-
proached in other ways, testing different types of regulatory theories. Some 
of these theories are not equipped to build an adequate explanation for the 
overlaps between the CRA and the Constitutional Court or the regulator’s 
role in a developing country. In this sense, the main purpose of this part is 
to explain (a) why some of the most influential explanatory theories, such as 
capture theories, fail to take into account key factors of this case study and 
(b) the reasons that support the use of the notions of regulatory rationales, 
regulatory enterprise and institutional isomorphism. This section uses the 
classification of the types of regulatory theories presented by Baldwin, Cave, 
and Lodge (2012) in the following four categories: “interest group,” “public 
interest,” “institutional” and “power of ideas explanations” theories. 
Most of the work on the relation between regulatory agencies and 
courts is based on the assumption that courts control agencies through their 
judicial review (see Baldwin and McCrudden 1987; Sunstein 1989, 2006; 
Eskridge and Baer 2008; Mashaw 2007). Within this literature – particularly 
with regard to the differences in interpretation of agency statutes between 
agencies and the judiciary in the United States – Lemos found that “judges, 
as lawyers, may have different intellectual priorities than agency policymak-
ers” and that “judicial interpretations are likely to be narrower than those of 
agencies” because the Supreme Court “was heavily dependent on specific 
indications of congressional intent,” while the agency (the Equal Employ-
ment Opportunity Commission) was “focused on the overall purpose or 
‘mission’ of the statute – which is, after all, the agency’s raison d’être” (Lemos 
2010: 434). 
The applicability of this literature in the analysis of this case study is 
limited. First, CRA regulations are not under the judicial review of the Con-
stitutional Court. Second, the role of courts is not the same in developed 
and developing countries, because of the radical differences in the configu-
ration of political institutions, such as the type of legislature (see Scheppele 
2005; Landau and López 2009; Landau 2012). These differences are particu-
larly evident between the United States and Colombia (see Landau and 
López 2009; Landau 2012). The limitations of this literature have also been 
pointed out by Thiruvengadam and Joshi (2012) regarding Indian telecom 
regulation. Still, this literature offers interesting findings about the possible 
“inbuilt” differences regarding statutory interpretations between the courts 
and agencies, which can be compared with the findings of this paper.  
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To analyze this case study beyond the limitations of said literature, it is 
necessary to explore different types of regulatory theories. Within the hege-
monic interest group theories (see Dal Bó 2006; Piori 2011), the works of 
Stigler (1971), Peltzman (1989) and Wilson (1980) are particularly repre-
sentative (Baldwin, Cave, and Lodge 2012). Stigler explains that regulation 
does not seek the public interest, but that “as a rule, regulation is acquired 
by the industry and is designed and operated primarily for its benefits” 
(Stigler 1971: 3). The regulator is captured by organized interests at the ex-
pense of a diffused group (Baldwin, Cave, and Lodge 2012). Similarly, Peltz-
man (1989) explains that deregulation cases are generally processes promot-
ed by the industry when regulation affects the wealth base on which the 
regulatory equilibrium is based. Wilson (1980) recognizes the “capture” of 
the regulator when there is a confrontation between “concentrated benefits” 
and “diffused costs,” which he calls “client politics.” However, he also ex-
plains that there are three other possibilities where there is no capture: “in-
terest group politics” (concentrated benefits and costs), “majoritarian poli-
tics” (diffused benefits and costs) and “entrepreneurial politics” (diffused 
benefits and concentrated costs). 
The interest group theories are ill-equipped to explain the Colombian 
case. From the theories developed by Stigler (1971) and Peltzman (1989), 
the capture of the CRA and Congress by the water and sanitation services 
industry would be the main explanation for CRA regulations. However, they 
are not capable of fully explaining the Colombian water and sanitation ser-
vices regulation because they do not analyze the role of the Constitutional 
Court and are not able to explain the legislative dysfunction that takes place 
in Colombia beyond the possible capture by the industry (see Landau and 
López 2009). For instance, they cannot explain why the Constitutional 
Court’s rulings support consumers’ claims rather than the industry’s inter-
ests. Similarly, Peltzman’s theory on deregulation cannot explain why the 
industry would capture the CRA and Congress but would not capture the 
Constitutional Court. 
Alternatively, according to Wilson’s theory (1980), the Colombian case 
could be an example of entrepreneurial politics. This is because there are 
concentrated costs (water providers) and diffused benefits (low-income 
consumers) regarding water service disconnection issues. In this sense, Co-
lombian regulation would not merely be the product of a regulatory capture. 
However, in the Colombian case, there is no “entrepreneur” that directs an 
organized coalition, but rather a number of individual claims from members 
of the “disorganized” group of water consumers. In sum, interest group 
theories are ill-equipped to analyze this case study because they do not real-
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ize the “role played by institutional arrangements in the shaping of regula-
tion” (Baldwin, Cave, and Lodge 2012: 48).  
According to public interest theories, regulation seeks “the protection 
and benefit of the public at large” (Hantke-Domas 2003). Within this group 
of theories, regulation is commonly seen as a response to a market failure 
(McVea 2005). However, beyond that traditional understanding, Prosser 
(2010) identified four positive-normative regulatory rationales in England. 
The efficiency and consumer choice rationale emphasizes the “lifting of 
regulatory burdens which prevent the free operation of markets” (Prosser 
2010: 13). It “views citizens solely in their capacity as consumers” (Prosser 
2010: 14). According to the human rights rationale, the regulator protects 
service users’ rights directly “through developing standards reflecting these 
rights and monitoring their application through inspection” (Prosser 2010: 
14). Here, “the very nature of a citizenship right means that [it] is universal-
izable” (Prosser 2010: 15). The social solidarity rationale “starts from the 
duties of the community to secure inclusiveness, resting both on a moral 
sense of equal citizenship and a more prudential goal of minimising social 
fragmentation,” – for example, the assurance of universal service (Prosser 
2010: 15). According to the participation and deliberation rationale, the 
regulator should provide “a forum in which participation and deliberation 
can take place” and the “key characteristics are regulatory transparency, 
regulatory consultation, accountability, and openness in general” (Prosser 
2010: 17).  
Additionally, Prosser (2010) explains that regulatory processes should 
be seen as a regulatory enterprise with different levels of government. In this 
way, the same author explains that regulators “have responsibility for both 
economic and social or distributive goals, which are anyway inseparable” 
and that “regulatory independence is not the key principle of institutional 
design, because regulation is a collaborative enterprise between regulatory 
agencies and other government bodies” in a “regulatory space” (Prosser 
2010: 8). From this perspective, “capture is less of a danger than lack of 
regulatory responsiveness” (Prosser 2010: 6).  
From the public-interest perspective, the overlap between the CRA and 
the Constitutional Court would be a consequence of their different under-
standings of public interest. The CRA and Congress consider the market to 
need a rule that orders the automatic disconnection of water service when 
there is no payment. As Majone (1997) prescribes, they attend only to the 
regulatory rationale of economic efficiency. In contrast, the Constitutional 
Court understands that regulation is not only guided by economic rationales, 
but also by substantial principles beyond market values (see Prosser 1999 
and 2010; Sunstein 1990; Feintuck 2010). Therefore, to understand the over-
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laps between the CRA and the Constitutional Court and the consequent role 
of the CRA, it is necessary to analyze the different regulatory rationales of 
Colombian water and sanitation services law.  
In developing countries, such as Colombia, the plurality of regulatory 
rationales (Prosser 2010) is often explicitly recognized in the constitution. As 
a consequence of the common understanding that ordinary politicians can-
not be trusted to achieve the changes that these societies hope for (see Sun-
stein 2001), most of these countries have thick constitutions (which include 
several social rights and specific economic mandates) and create constitu-
tional courts to ensure that their mandates will have force (Scheppele 2005; 
Landau and López 2009). This phenomenon has led to the “juridification of 
regulation,” defined by Padgett (1992: 205) as a “tendency to express ethical, 
social and economic issues in the form of legal or constitutional precepts, 
and to resolve those issues through the judicial process.” Among the most 
developed countries, probably only Germany shares this tendency. For in-
stance, in a paper on nuclear regulation, Padgett (1992) explains that in con-
trast to the pragmatic and flexible regulatory regimes in Britain and France, 
the German regime is characterized by a juridification of regulation.   
However, from Prosser’s perspective, the problem is not only the lack 
of recognition by the CRA and Congress of the plurality of regulatory ra-
tionales, but also their hierarchical understanding of regulation. The emer-
gence of overlaps between the CRA and the Constitutional Court is not 
uncommon in utilities regulation (see Prosser 2010). The real challenge is to 
find a way to develop relations between the different actors in the regulatory 
space toward a regulatory enterprise. In sum, Prosser’s theory on regulatory 
rationales and the notion of regulatory enterprise are useful not only to 
understand this case study (with all of its actors) but also to identify a nor-
mative state of the world. However, it is not similarly useful to explain the 
origin of the current regulatory rationales of the CRA beyond its normative 
mapping.  
The institutional theories are based on the assumption that “institutions 
structure actions, and perhaps preferences, and are themselves shaped by 
the actions of individuals and organizations” (Black 1997: 74). Within this 
trend, McCubbins, Noll, and Weingast (1987) developed one of the most 
influential works on regulatory agencies in the literature (Baldwin, Cave, and 
Lodge 2012). They explain that a principal–agent relationship emerges be-
tween the enacting coalition (Congress and the president) – the principal – 
and the created regulatory agency – the agent – (McCubbins, Noll, and 
Weingast 1987). The interests and objectives of the bureaucrat agents may 
be different from those of the coalition (McCubbins, Noll, and Weingast 
1987). However, the enacting coalition can control agencies through “police 
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patrols” (constant monitoring), “fire alarms” activated by affected constitu-
encies, and administrative procedures (McCubbins, Noll, and Weingast 
1987).   
In the institutional analysis of Hancher and Moran (1989) and Black 
(2001), the same determinism of the interest group found in the works of 
Stigler and Peltzman is not present. As Black explains (1997: 77), “the cap-
ture thesis, which is rooted in neoclassical economics, has to be modified if 
the other factors, for which neoclassical economics has no room, are to 
operate.” Moreover, the concepts of regulatory space (Hancher and Moran 
1989) and “decentered regulation” (Black 1997, 2001) explain that diverse 
public and private actors share the regulatory authority (there is no monopo-
ly) and emphasize the central role of the communication between them. In 
this respect, as Scott (2001: 331) explains, a regulatory reform  
might then focus not exclusively, or even mainly, on a single organisa-
tion, but rather on the whole configuration of resources and relations 
within the regulatory space. […] This conception of organic reform 
supports normative approaches to law and regulation which argue for 
greater responsiveness or reflexivity as an alternative to the dead end 
of legalisation or juridification. 
These institutional theories offer interesting possibilities for a better applica-
tion of Prosser’s notions to this case study. From the institutional perspec-
tive developed by McCubbins, Noll, and Weingast, the overlap between 
CRA regulations and Constitutional Court rulings could be a principal-agent 
problem between the CRA and the “enacted coalition” – for example, a lack 
of monitoring or a problem in the appointees. However, the CRA is, in fact, 
merely attending to the Public Utilities Statute prepared by the government 
and approved by Congress. In any case, it is relevant to explore the relation 
between the agency and the members of the coalition, or even a different 
principal-agent problem between the enacted coalition and its constituents. 
Moreover, the works of Hancher and Moran (1989) and Black (2001), which 
to some extent support the notion of regulatory enterprise (Prosser 2010), 
are particularly relevant for a better understanding of the plurality of actors 
with regulatory authority regarding the water service disconnection issues in 
Colombia and the number of complexities of their communication.  
Finally, the gap in Prosser’s theory in explaining the origin of the cur-
rent regulatory rationales of the CRA can be filled by the concept of institu-
tional isomorphism (see DiMaggio and Powell 1991). There are three types 
of institutional isomorphism: “coercive,” “mimetic,” and “normative.” Co-
ercive isomorphism results from economic, financial, political or legal pres-
sures by other organizations upon which the organization is dependent 
(DiMaggio and Powell 1991; Thatcher 2007). Mimetic processes are derived 
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from uncertainty. The organizations model themselves on organizations that 
“they perceive to be more legitimate or successful” (DiMaggio and Powell 
1991: 70). These processes “can take the form of attempts at rational anal-
yses of overseas experiences and their applicability domestically” (Thatcher 
2007: 32–33). Normative pressures stem from the “collective struggle of 
members of an occupation to define the conditions and methods of their 
work, […] and to establish a cognitive base and legitimation for their occu-
pational autonomy” (DiMaggio and Powell 1991: 70). In this way, transna-
tional epistemic communities “can be important vehicles for transmitting 
norms across nations” (Thatcher 2007: 32).  
Therefore, the main explanation of the origin of the regulatory ration-
ales applied by the CRA is not necessarily its own understanding of the 
public interest or the product of a regulatory capture. The regulatory ration-
ales’ origins are explained as a consequence of resembling other units’ re-
sponses because of external pressures, uncertainty or the action of epistemic 
communities. This hypothesis is plausible keeping in mind that institutional 
isomorphism has been widely used to explain the diffusion of institutional 
designs and regulatory instruments (Gilardi 2002, 2005; Thatcher 2002, 
2007; Baldwin, Cave, and Lodge 2012). Thatcher explains that DiMaggio 
and Powell analyzed “organisations rather than national institutions, but 
their insights can be applied to internationalisation and sectoral economic 
institutions” (2007: 31). Additionally, Meyer explains that peripheral coun-
tries, such as Colombia, experience more isomorphism than their central 
peers (DiMaggio and Powell 1991). For example, regarding Latin America, 
Drake (1989) explains that since the 1920s, regulation based on separate 
agencies was “strongly influenced” by North American designs, while Levi-
Faur (2003) argues that the processes of privatization and liberalization were 
“less voluntary” than in Europe. Moreover, Jordana and Levi-Faur (2005) 
highlight the significant role of “normative isomorphism” in the creation 
and reform of several regulatory agencies in the same sector across different 
countries in Latin America from 1979 to 2002.  
2 Mapping the Positions of the CRA and the 
Constitutional Court  
In each one of the case studies analyzed in his book, Prosser (2010) maps 
the position of the regulators within the regulatory space based on the no-
tions of regulatory rationales and regulatory enterprise. He uses two meth-
ods of mapping: interinstitutional mapping and normative mapping. The 
former examines the regulator’s relations with other institutions; the latter, 
the “patterns of norms governing each regulator, for example its statutory 
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duties and corporate objectives” (Prosser 2010: 7). The main purpose of this 
section is to present a similar analysis regarding the CRA and the Constitu-
tional Court as well as to highlight the impact on Colombia’s water regula-
tion of the precarious functioning of the legislature, the thick constitution 
and the activist judicial enforcement of social rights.  
2.1 Interinstitutional Mapping 
Historically, Congress has represented few of the Colombian social groups 
other than rural bosses (Landau and López 2009; Gutiérrez 2010). It has 
failed to initiate policy proposals, supervise major policy proposals originat-
ing from the executive, and check the implementation of these policies 
(Landau and López 2009). This legislature has not been responsive to the 
main social issues, but has merely increased pork barrel and other individual 
benefits (such as bureaucratic quotas) that it can obtain from the executive 
(Landau and López 2009). Generally, presidents have unilaterally dominated 
the policy-making process (Landau and López 2009). 
The CRA and the Constitutional Court were created during one of the 
most reformist periods (1990–1994) in Colombia’s recent history. In 1990, 
César Gaviria was elected president. He was a young economist and former 
minister of finance who favored market-oriented reforms, such as the re-
moval of trade barriers and critical privatization processes (Biglaiser and 
Brown 2003). Gaviria called for National Constitutional Assembly elections 
in 1991 (Falleti 2010). He also appointed to the highest positions young 
professionals who had been educated abroad and favored the institutional 
models from Britain and the United States (Vélez 2010).  
The Constitutional Assembly created the Constitutional Court to en-
sure that the Constitution would have powers even if traditional political 
actors were not reformed (Landau and López 2009; López 2010; Landau 
2012).1 In such an environment, the Colombian Constitutional Court has 
become one of the most activist courts in the world (Landau and López 
2009). As Landau and López explain (2009: 57), the Constitutional Court  
has acted as a replacement for the legislature on various issues and at 
various times, by injecting policy into the system, by managing highly 
complex, polycentric policy issues, and by developing a thick con-
struct of constitutional rights that it uses to check executive power.  
1  With the same purpose, the Constitution provided that international treaties on 
human rights constitute relevant criteria for interpreting constitutional rights (see 
López 2010; Nieto 2011). 
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This role has seen the Constitutional Court involved in serious confronta-
tions not only with the executive, but also with the Supreme Court and the 
Council of State (Colombia’s highest contentious administrative tribunal) 
(Uprimny and García 2002). In turn, some members of Congress have 
learned that the Constitutional Court’s role allows them to avoid the politi-
cal costs involved in monitoring legislation for constitutionality (Landau and 
López 2009).  
The technocrat team led by Gaviria created the CRA in 1992 through a 
presidential decree.2 The CRA’s structure and functions were improved by 
Law 142 of 1994, also known as the Public Utilities Statute. With a small 
degree of foreign input, the Public Utilities Statute’s bill was prepared by the 
National Planning Agency (DNP) – which hired Hugo Palacios, a Colombi-
an lawyer and economist as well as ex-minister of finance and former execu-
tive director of the Inter-American Development Bank (for Colombia and 
Peru), to lead the drafting of the bill. In undertaking this task, Palacios drew 
upon his own experience (e.g., dealing with power-sector debts), studies 
prepared by DNP economists (generally grounded on the work of Alfred 
Kahn) and works prepared by a group of economists from England,3 the 
United States and Australia (Vélez 2010). Regarding institutional design, this 
bill mainly focused on the organization of “independent regulatory agen-
cies” (Vélez 2010). As Palacios stated,  
there was no ‘model’ that we would have adopted or wanted to follow 
and, much better, we would have wanted to do something that would 
attend to our experiences but, of course, we could not have invented 
the world, nor things already invented.4  
The bill proposal did not suffer substantial modifications by Congress 
(Vélez 2010).  
Currently, the CRA is composed of the minister of housing (who also 
acts as president of the CRA), the director of the DNP, the minister of 
health, and four commissioners appointed by the president. The Domestic 
Utility Services Superintendency (SSPD) participates in the CRA with voice 
but without vote. Since its creation, the majority of these commissioners 
have been engineers and economists (Castalia 2005); at least one-third have 
2  National Decree 2152 of 1992, articles 4, 59 and 60.  
3  Hugo Palacios, external advisor who prepared the Public Utilities Statute’s draft 
and current managing partner of the Colombian leading law firm regarding public 
utilities regulation, interview 4th February 2012.  
4  Hugo Palacios, interview 4th February 2012. In Spanish, he said: “No hubo un 
‘modelo’ que hubiéramos adoptado o querido seguir y, más bien, quisimos hacer al-
go que consultara nuestras experiencias pero, por supuesto, no podíamos tampoco 
inventar el mundo ni cosas ya inventadas.” 
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not been technocratic experts on water issues, but persons well connected to 
politicians (Castalia 2005). During the interviews, both a commissioner5 and 
the current director of institutional relations at Colombia’s biggest public 
utility6 highlighted the CRA’s limited financial resources to develop its tasks. 
The Constitutional Court cannot directly control CRA regulations; they 
are under the judicial review of the Council of State. Therefore, to some 
extent, the formal relation between Constitutional Court rulings and CRA 
regulations is mediated by the Council of State.  
Finally, the relation between the CRA and Congress reflects the critical 
dysfunction of the Colombian legislature. The commissioners interviewed7 
explained that, at this time, the CRA does not have an active relationship 
with Congress beyond the application of the current Public Utilities Statute. 
In fact, since 2005, the number of requirements to report back to Congress 
has substantially decreased.8 This limited communication was confirmed by 
the legal director of the SSPD.9 She explains that most members of Con-
gress are unaware of the functions of the CRA. Thus, in several hearings, 
they have mistakenly compelled the SSPD and ministries to report on tariffs 
or other CRA issues. Moreover, it is common for members of Congress to 
prepare policy proposals without CRA information. In general, these draft 
proposals have inadequate technical support and foster the immediate de-
crease or limitation of public utilities rates (López and García 2008) or the 
increase of taxes that public utilities have to pay. Consequently, it is possible 
to argue that the CRA is not particularly relevant for Congress beyond  
the general possibilities of obtaining bureaucratic quotas, like in any other  
agency.  
2.2 Normative Mapping 
In the 1991 Constitutional Assembly, the main issues regarding public ser-
vices were the growing external debt of the power sector and the crisis of 
the centralized and politicized system of water and sanitation provision 
(Vélez 2010). In such an environment, Colombia’s thick Constitution en-
sured (a) the liberalization of public services as a general rule (art. 365); (b) 
5  Commissioner, interview 3rd April 2012.  
6  Rubén Darío Avendaño, former public official at the DNP who worked on the 
Public Utilities Statute’s draft, former CRA commissioner and current director of 
institutional relations at Empresas Públicas de Medellín (Public Utilities of Medel-
lin), interview 18th July 2012.  
7  Three of the four current commissioners, interviews 3rd April, 5th June and 12th 
June 2012.  
8  Commissioner, interview 5th June 2012.  
9  Marina Montes, legal director of the SSPD, interview 19th April 2012. 
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efficiency, universal service and the protection of private providers against 
expropriation as substantial principles of public utilities regulation (art. 365); 
(c) that public utility rates addressed the criteria of cost, solidarity and in-
come redistribution (art. 367); (d) that subsidies only apply to low-income 
people (art. 368); (e) the right of consumers to audit providers owned by the 
Colombian state (art. 369); and (f) the creation of an agency (SSPD) charged 
with monitoring and enforcing utilities compliance (art. 370). Furthermore, 
several social and collective rights, such as the right to water (art. 94; López 
and García 2008) and the right to adequate housing (art. 51; Sepúlveda 
2008), were included in the new Constitution.10  
According to the Constitution of 1991, the Constitutional Court has 
the powers to hear abstract review petitions initiated at any time by any 
single Colombian citizen as well as to review any ruling issued as a result of 
an acción de tutela (Landau and López 2009). The latter is an individual com-
plaint procedure to enforce the constitutional rights, such as the right to 
water, against any public or private actor (Landau and López 2009). The 
tutela has been widely used, particularly regarding health and housing claims 
(Uprimny 2006), not only because of the progressive doctrines of the Court, 
but also because of its low cost and the fact that these cases are heard quick-
ly (Landau and López 2009). Since 1992, the Court has issued a number of 
rulings on the right to water and on the suspension of water provision.11 
The Public Utilities Statute, which developed these constitutional man-
dates, applied to water and sanitation services, telecommunications, electrici-
ty and gas.12 This statute is mainly based on (a) competition between pro-
viders, (b) no entry or exit barriers, (c) mandatory commercial orientation 
for every provider, (d) a tariff-setting system that only recognizes efficient 
economic costs, and (e) basic-consumption subsidies for low-income people 
only (Palacios 1999; López and Garcia 2008). Regarding service disconnec-
tion, the statute (art. 140) states that every service should be disconnected 
after two or three unpaid bills depending on the bill’s frequency. This statute 
mainly requires the CRA to develop tariff methodologies that not only en-
sure cost recovery but also promote economic efficiency. Also, article 73.1 
allows the CRA to prepare bill proposals on water issues for the central 
government.  
10  See Constitutional Court rulings T-270 of 2007, T-888 of 2008, T-381 of 2009, T-
614 of 2010, C-220 of 2011, T-273 of 2012, T-525 of 2012.  
11  See Constitutional Court rulings T-406 of 1992, T-578 of 1992, T-380 of 1994, T-
092 of 1995, T-481 of 1997, T-270 of 2007, T-888 of 2008, T-381 of 2009, T-091 
de 2010, T-614 of 2010 and T-273 of 2012.  
12  Since 2009, there is a special law regarding telecommunications.  
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3 The Overlaps between the Water and  
Sanitation Regulatory Commission (CRA) 
and the Constitutional Court 
The overlaps between CRA regulations and Constitutional Court rulings 
regarding water service disconnection issues have been common. Without 
exception, the Public Utilities Statute and CRA regulations order the dis-
connection of water provision after a three-month period of non-payment 
(CRA 2011). The CRA states that it cannot change its regulations on dis-
connections without legal reform.13 On the other hand, the Constitutional 
Court has, in a number of cases, ruled in favor of the tutelas against a provid-
er for depriving an individual belonging to a vulnerable population of the 
“minimum essential level of water” due to their failure to pay. These rulings 
have been primarily based on General Comment 15 of the UN Committee 
on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (see López 2010).  
Despite the fact that CRA regulations are not under the judicial review 
of the Constitutional Court, the effects of the latter’s rulings on water regu-
lation are significant. Constitutional Court rulings regarding water service 
disconnection issues have followed the “individualized model,” giving a 
“single remedy to a single plaintiff” but tending “to deny systematic reme-
dies that would affect larger groups” (Landau 2012: 404). Moreover, despite 
the activist character of the Constitutional Court (Landau and López 2009), 
it has not even required Congress to provide a systematic remedy that pro-
tects the constitutional rights of consumers and investors. However, given 
the Constitutional Court’s “extraordinary institutional popularity” and even 
“democratic legitimacy” (Landau and López 2009: 57), its rulings are well 
known by common citizens and have been replicated by several judges.14 
Consequently, private and public water providers have to disconnect water 
service in order to comply with CRA regulations, but they have to reconnect 
service in a significant number of cases as a consequence of a judicial deci-
sion.15 
13  CRA, official communication signed by its executive director, 8th March 2012.  
14  Rubén Darío Avendaño, interview 18th July 2012.  
15  Currently, it is not possible to determine at the national level the exact number of 
tutelas associated with the right to water. First, the statistics related to tutelas are pre-
pared by the “Consejo Superior de la Judiciatura” (Judicial Supreme Council). This body 
has not created a specific category related to the tutelas to enforce the right to water 
(Defensoría del Pueblo 2010: 173, 186). Second, it is common that water issues are 
claimed as part of the rights to life, to adequate housing or some other related 
rights (Defensoría del Pueblo 2010: 172–173, 183).  
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Nonetheless, the commissioners state that there is no overlap between 
the CRA and the Constitutional Court. They have consistently rejected any 
reference to the notions of overlaps, conflicts, competition or communica-
tion between regulators or regulatory rationales. Their views regarding the 
Constitutional Court varied from (a) having no power to develop general 
rules regarding water and sanitation services, (b) to issuing rulings with a 
tangential role in water and sanitation regulation, (c) to creating restrictions 
that foreign regulatory agencies do not have.16  
A different explanation for the lack of initiative of the CRA to promote 
deliberative processes on how to deal with those overlaps could be the 
commissioner’s fear of personal liability. According to a report to the World 
Bank on the economic regulation of Colombia’s water and sanitation sector 
(Castalia 2005), CRA commissioners are largely motivated by factors related 
to their (a) career path, (b) political capital, and (c) personal liability. Career 
path refers to their future as international consultants. The maintenance of 
their political capital implies the avoidance of decisions that could negatively 
affect their political mentors. The fear of personal liability makes them more 
prone to making decisions where they face less risk of being subjected to a 
lawsuit. Bearing in mind the omnipresent legalism during the interviews with 
the commissioners, particularly regarding the Public Utilities Statute, it is 
possible to argue that one of the main causes of the CRA’s limited initiative 
to deal with the mentioned overlaps could be the commissioners’ fear of 
personal liability.  
For years, water service disconnection issues have been affecting thou-
sands of poor families as well as water providers.17 However, unlike some 
other actors in this regulatory space, the CRA was late in actively participat-
ing in the debate on the regulation of the minimum essential level of water. 
It was not until May 2012 that the CRA sent a draft bill on the minimum 
essential level of water to the minister of housing.18 Before this, a water 
consumer NGO promoted a referendum to overcome water service discon-
nection issues and obtained more than 2 million supporters in 2008 (see El 
Espectador 2008), and, in February 2012, the municipal government of Bogo-
16  Three of the four current commissioners, interviews 3rd April, 5th June and 12th 
June 2012.  
17  According to the Empresa de Acueducto y Alcantarillado de Bogotá (Bogota’s 
water and sanitation provider), in February 2012 in Bogotá, there were 66.219 water 
connections suspended or disconnected because of no payment. See Alfredo Bate-
man, Sub Secretary of Economic Development of Bogotá, interview 23rd July 2012. 
Regarding the situation of water providers see Rubén Darío Avendaño, interview 
18th July 2012.  
18  CRA, official communication signed by its executive director, 18th May 2012.  
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tá began to pay for the minimum essential level of water for the poorest 
families of the city.19  
4 The Colombian Case through the Lens of 
Prosser’s Theory and Institutional  
Isomorphism
Using Prosser’s (2010) notions of regulatory rationales with the institutional 
concept of regulatory space (Hancher an Moran 1989; Scott 2001), it is pos-
sible to map this case study. First, the Colombian Constitution explicitly 
incorporates all of the mentioned regulatory rationales: efficiency and con-
sumer choice (arts. 365 and 367), human rights (arts. 13, 42, 44, 46, 49, 51, 
78, 80, 94), social solidarity (arts. 95, 365, 368), and participation and delib-
eration (arts. 23, 369). Nonetheless, Congress and the CRA have given more 
relevance to the provisions of efficiency and consumer choice and social 
solidarity (see García and Castro 2003). With regard to service disconnec-
tions, the Public Utilities Statute only took efficiency and consumer choice 
into account, which has thereafter been applied through CRA regulations.  
In this regulatory space, there are at least two competing views on wa-
ter service disconnection issues. From the CRA’s perspective, according to 
the regulatory rationale of efficiency and consumer choice, citizens are 
viewed “solely in their capacity as consumers” (see Prosser 2010: 14). There-
fore, the CRA’s imaginary statement would be: “Without payment, there is 
no water provision.” In contrast, the Constitutional Court has been applying 
the plurality of regulatory rationales recognized by the Constitution, includ-
ing the human rights regulatory rationale. Thus, the Constitutional Court’s 
imaginary statement would be: “As a general rule, without payment, there is 
no water provision – but there are some exceptions based on human  
rights.” This statement has also been replicated by several judges around the  
country.  
In relation to water service disconnection issues, the CRA and Con-
gress have been limited to the regulatory rationale of efficiency and consum-
er choice, probably as a consequence of different episodes of institutional 
isomorphism. The Colombian system has some specific features – particu-
larly the separation between monitoring and surveillance (SSPD) and setting 
rules (CRA) (see Palacios 1999). Nonetheless, the CRA’s creation by decree 
in 1992 and the subsequent Public Utilities Statute in 1994 can be seen as 
examples of the mimetic isomorphism of “legitimate” and “successful” 
19  Alcaldía Mayor de Bogotá, Decree 064 of 2012.  
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models from the United States and Britain. Despite a small degree of foreign 
involvement,20 the key factor is that the reform was mainly focused on the 
domestic adaptation of the imported idea of independent regulatory agen-
cies (Vélez 2010).  
Furthermore, it is possible to argue that two additional types of institu-
tional isomorphism have emerged within the history of the CRA. Once the 
Public Utilities Statute was issued by Congress, the regulatory rationale ap-
plied by the CRA has also been a case of coercive isomorphism through a 
legal form (see Thatcher 2007). Since then, a legal mandate orders the CRA 
to apply the same regulatory rationale regarding nonpayment situations 
applied by the regulatory agencies for telecommunications and energy and 
gas. Furthermore, according to the interviews with three of the four current 
CRA commissioners, a case of normative isomorphism could be identified. 
During the interviews, they made general references to the emphasis placed 
on efficiency issues by the foreign regulatory agencies. These perceptions 
and the consequent normative isomorphism around the preeminence of the 
efficiency regulatory rationale could be further obstacles to the CRA’s 
recognition of the plurality of regulatory rationales. Additionally, the majori-
ty of CRA commissioners have been engineers and economists (Castalia 
2005), who may tend toward regulatory rationales closer to their disciplines. 
The available evidence seems consistent with Prosser’s theory and the 
institutional theories discussed here (see Hancher and Moran 1989; Black 
2001; Scott 2001). It is clear that the interest group theories are not capable 
of explaining the current water service regulation in Colombia. First, there is 
not only one regulator, but rather a number of “regulators.” Second, in 
1991, the Colombian centralized and politicized system of water and sanita-
tion provision had no political support (Vélez 2010); therefore, the origin of 
the preeminence of the efficiency and consumer choice regulatory rationale 
in CRA regulations was not associated with the interests of a powerful in-
dustry. Moreover, the evidence supports the idea that it was caused by dif-
ferent episodes of institutional isomorphism. Third, despite the significant 
power of the Constitutional Court (one of the water and sanitation services 
regulatory authority bodies), it has always been beyond the capture of the 
industry. The factors around the Constitutional Court’s positions and the 
effects thereof have no room in capture theories (see Sunstein 1990; Black 
2001). 
The CRA has been applying Majone’s position, rejecting any other reg-
ulatory rationale different from economic efficiency. Moreover, the empha-
20  See Hugo Palacios, interview 4th February 2012 and Rubén Darío Avendaño, inter-
view 18th July 2012. 
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sis of the commissioners during the interviews on the limited communica-
tion between the CRA and Congress and the CRA’s independence seems 
like another product of the hegemony of the above-mentioned interest 
group theories (see Piore 2011). In this respect, the dominant theories on 
the regulator’s role would find the CRA’s position appropriate. However, 
because of the country’s institutional context, this may not be sensible. Giv-
en the situation of thousands of poor families (more than sixty thousand in 
Bogotá) and water providers affected by these overlaps, it would suggest 
that the CRA’s understanding of its independence and regulatory rationales 
could be highly problematic in the Colombian context.  
As it is predicted by Prosser’s theory (2010), the limited communication 
between the CRA and the rest of the actors with regulatory authority has 
affected the responsiveness of the regulation. This limitation could explain 
why Congress does not have a clear idea about the CRA’s functions and, 
normally, does not use the CRA’s information in its proposals and debates. 
Moreover, the CRA’s lack of financial resources (highlighted during the 
interviews) could also be associated with the CRA’s passive understanding 
of the regulatory tasks (see Campbell 2007). Similarly, the CRA’s isolated 
perception of regulatory authority could explain why it took nearly two dec-
ades after the Constitutional Court’s first rulings on the right to water and 
the suspension of water provision for the CRA to send the minister of hous-
ing a draft bill on the minimum essential level of water that included some 
of the rationales of the Constitutional Court’s rulings (see CRA 2012a, b).  
The definition of the CRA’s role should not be restricted by capture 
worries and the regulatory rationale of economic efficiency. The lack of 
recognition of the plurality of regulatory rationales that is affecting consum-
ers and investors has been reinforced by the CRA’s emphasis on its inde-
pendence rather than on the responsiveness of regulation (see Prosser 2010; 
Scott 2001). Given the critical dysfunction of the legislature, the CRA 
should be able not only to promote debates in Congress around the most 
important regulatory issues, but also to directly provide “a forum in which 
participation and deliberation can take place” (Prosser 2010: 17). Moreover, 
the CRA should understand that it shares regulatory authority with other 
actors (see Scott 2001) and, therefore, must be in continuous dialogue with 
the Constitutional Court. For both purposes, the CRA should be able to 
apply the plurality of regulatory rationales described by Prosser (2010), par-
ticularly the participation and deliberation and the human rights regulatory 
rationales.  
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5 Conclusions 
Regulation researchers must focus on the political context to develop tools 
appropriate for evaluating regulatory agencies outside the developed world. 
In the case of Colombia, the political setting includes (a) a congress that has 
serious difficulties in initiating and monitoring the enforcement of policy 
(Landau and López 2009), (b) a consequent thick constitution that implies 
juridification of regulation, (c) and one of the most activist constitutional 
courts in the world (Landau and López 2009). This context creates several 
challenges such as more continuous overlaps between regulatory rationales 
that affect consumers and investors, without having a congress with the 
willingness and ability to carry out the needed legal transformations by itself.  
In Colombia, the applicability of American and British literature on the 
relations between regulatory agencies and courts is limited. CRA regulations 
are not under judicial review by the Constitutional Court. More importantly, 
the Constitutional Court’s role in Colombia is different from that in the 
developed world because of the dysfunction of the Colombian Congress 
(see Landau and López 2009). For instance, in the United States “judicial 
interpretations are likely to be narrower than those of agencies” (Lemos 
2010: 434). However, in Colombia, the CRA is significantly legalist and the 
Constitutional Court is one of the most activist around the world (Landau 
2012).  
Accordingly, it is necessary to fill this gap by exploring different regula-
tory theories. Despite the fact that interest group theories are the most in-
fluential around the world regarding regulatory issues (see Dal Bó 2006; 
Piori 2011), they are ill-equipped to analyze the Colombian case – particular-
ly the Constitutional Court’s role in the regulation of water service discon-
nection issues. In contrast, the notions of regulatory rationales, regulatory 
enterprise (Prosser 2010), regulatory space (Hancher and Moran 1989; Scott 
2001) and institutional isomorphism (DiMaggio and Powell 1991) speak 
directly to the main issues of this case study – they are useful for mapping it, 
with all of its actors, and explaining the origin of the CRA’s regulatory ra-
tionale.  
The overlaps between CRA regulations and Constitutional Court rul-
ings have been caused by Congress and the CRA failing to recognize the 
plurality of regulatory rationales. The Colombian Constitution recognizes 
the four regulatory rationales described by Prosser (2010): (1) efficiency and 
consumer choice, (2) human rights, (3) social solidarity, and (4) participation 
and deliberation. Regarding service disconnections, however, the Public 
Utilities Statute only took into account the efficiency and consumer choice 
rationale, which has thereafter been applied through CRA regulations. 
Without exception, the Public Utilities Statute and CRA regulations order 
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the disconnection of water provision after a three-month period of non-
payment. Citizens are solely viewed in their capacity as consumers (see 
Prosser 2010). In contrast, the Constitutional Court rulings apply the plurali-
ty of regulatory rationales recognized by the Constitution, including the 
human rights rationale. The Constitutional Court, as “water regulator,” has 
been protecting the rights of individual service users by applying the stand-
ards on the right to water specified in General Comment 15 by the UN 
Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights. The Constitutional 
Court’s rulings have been reproduced by several judges around the country. 
It is possible that the main explanation for the origin of the regulatory 
rationale applied by the CRA regarding water service disconnection issues is 
not related to its understanding of the public interest or the product of a 
regulatory capture, but rather a consequence of institutional isomorphism. 
The CRA’s regulatory rationale resembles other units’ responses because of 
uncertainty (upon its creation), external pressures (e.g., the legal mandates of 
the Public Utilities Statute), and the actions of epistemic communities (e.g., 
economists and engineers’ understandings of water regulation).  
In sum, given the political conditions in this country, Prosser’s notion 
of regulatory enterprise is more appropriate for the Colombian case than is 
the dominant literature on the regulator’s role. In the developed world, a 
well-functioning legislature is the preeminent option for formulating policy 
(Landau and López 2009). In this context, an activist regulatory agency may 
be prejudicial to the system’s development. Most regulatory literature rests 
upon this assumption. But where the legislature is dysfunctional, as it is in 
Colombia, a regulatory agency that recognizes the plurality of regulatory 
rationales and promotes deliberation within Congress around the most im-
portant regulatory issues seems a more suitable alternative. In Colombia, 
specifically, communication between the CRA and the Constitutional Court 
is essential, keeping in mind that as a consequence of juridification of regula-
tion it is almost impossible to conceive of a regulatory issue that does not 
potentially raise constitutional problems. Moreover, in practice, this com-
munication is essential for consumers and providers because of the activist 
judicial enforcement that exists in Colombia. In this respect, the CRA 
should be less concerned with its independence and more focused on the 
responsiveness of Colombian water regulation through a regulatory enter-
prise with all actors in this regulatory space (see Hancher and Moran 1989; 
Scott 2001).  
This qualitative research does not allow for generalizable conclusions in 
the developing world. However, this case study seeks to make a contribution 
to the demonstration that the role of a regulatory agency cannot be the same 
in developed and developing countries because of the considerable differ-
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ences in the configuration of political institutions, such as the type of legisla-
ture. It is part of a still-emerging literature on the “rise of the regulatory state 
of the South” (Dubash and Morgan 2012), particularly on distribution mat-
ters (see also Urueña 2012).  
References 
Baldwin, R., and C. McCrudden (1987), Regulation and Public Law, London: 
Weidenfeld and Nicolson. 
Baldwin, R., M. Cave, and M. Lodge (²2012), Understanding Regulation: Theory, 
Strategy, and Practice, New York: Oxford University Press.  
Biglaiser, G., and D. Brown (2003), The Determinants of Privatization in 
Latin America, in: Political Research Quarterly, 56, 1, 77–89.  
Black, J. (2001), Decentring Regulation: Understanding the Role of Regula-
tion and Self Regulation in a ‘Post-Regulatory’ World, in: Current Legal 
Problems, 54, 103–147. 
Black, J. (1997), New Institutionalism and Naturalism in Socio-Legal Analy-
sis: Institutionalist Approaches to Regulatory Decision Making, in: Law 
and Policy, 19, 51–93. 
Campbell, C. (2007), Spontaneous Adaptation in Public Management, in: 
Governance, 20, 3, 377–400.  
Castalia Strategic Advisors (2005), Case Study in Colombia’s Water and Sanitation 
Sector Economic Regulation. Final Report, Washington, DC: World Bank.  
Comisión de Regulación de Agua Potable y Saneamiento Básico de la 
República de Colombia (Colombian Water and Sanitation Regulatory 
Commission) (2012a), Official Communication signed by its Executive Director 
(8 March 2012).  
Comisión de Regulación de Agua Potable y Saneamiento Básico de la Repú-
blica de Colombia (Colombian Water and Sanitation Regulatory Com-
mission) (2012b), Official Communication signed by its Executive Director (18 
May 2012). 
CRA see Comisión de Regulación de Agua Potable y Saneamiento Básico de 
la República de Colombia 
Dal Bó, E. (2006), Regulatory Capture: A Review, in: Oxford Review of Eco-
nomic Policy, 22, 2, 203–225. 
Defensoría del Pueblo (2010), El Derecho Humano al Agua. Diagnóstico de la 
accesibilidad económica y el acceso a la información (The right to water. Evaluation 
of the economic accessibility and the access to information), Bogotá: Defensoría 
del Pueblo.  
 
 126 Julián Daniel López-Murcia 
DiMaggio, P., and W. Powell (1991), The Iron Cage Revisited: Institutional 
Isomorphism and Collective Rationality in Organization Fields, in: W. 
Powell and P. DiMaggio (eds), The New Institutionalism in Organizational 
Analysis, Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 63–82.  
Drake, Paul W. (1989), The Money Doctor in the Andes. U.S. Advisors, Investors, 
and Economic Reform in Latin America from World War I to the Great Depres-
sion, Durham: Duke University Press. 
Dubash, N., and B. Morgan (2012), Understanding the rise of the regulatory 
state of the South, in: Regulation & Governance, 6, 261–281. 
El Espectador (2008), Luz Verde al Referendo del Agua, 14 September, on-
line: <www.elespectador.com/impreso/vivir/articuloimpreso-luz-ver 
de-al-referendo-del-agua> (30 August 2012). 
Eskridge, W., and L. Baer (2008), The Continuum of Deference: Supreme 
Court Treatment of Agency Statutory Interpretations from Chevron to 
Hamdan, in: The Georgetown Law Journal, 96, 4, 1083–1226. 
Falleti, T (2010), Decentralization and subnational politics in Latin America, New 
York: Cambridge University Press. 
Feintuck, M. (2010), Regulatory Rationales Beyond the Economic: In Search 
of the Public Interest, in: R. Baldwin, M. Cave, and M. Lodge (eds), The 
Oxford Handbook of Regulation, New York: Oxford University Press, 39–
63.  
García, L., and E. Castro (2003), La Crisis de la Protección del Derecho 
Colectivo a los Servicios Públicos Domiciliarios (The Crisis of the Pro-
tection of the Collective Right to Household Services), in: B. Londoño 
(ed.), Estado de Crisis o Crisis del Estado, Bogotá: Ediciones Rosaristas, 
409–432. 
Gilardi, F. (2005), The Institutional Foundations of Regulatory Capitalism: 
The Diffusion of Independent Regulatory Agencies in Western Europe, 
in: Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science, 598, 84–
101. 
Gilardi, F. (2002), Policy Credibility and Delegation to Independent Regula-
tory Agencies, in: Journal of European Public Policy, 9, 6, 873–893. 
Gutiérrez, F. (2010), Instituciones y territorio: la descentralización en Co-
lombia (Institutions and territory: the decentralization in Colombia, in: 
25 Años de la Descentralización en Colombia, 11–54. 
Hancher, L., and M. Moran (eds) (1989), Capitalism, Culture and Economic 
Regulation, New York: Oxford University Press.  
Handtke-Domas, M. (2003), The Public Interest Theory of Regulation: 
Non-Existence or Misinterpretation, in: European Journal of Law and Eco-
nomics, 15, 165–194. 
 The Overlaps in Colombian Water Regulation 127 
Jordana, J., and D. Levi-Faur (2005), The Diffusion of Regulatory Capital-
ism in Latin America: Sectoral and National Channels in the Making of 
a New Order, in: Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Sci-
ence, 598, 102–124. 
Jordana, J., and C. Ramió (2010), Delegation, Presidential Regimes, and 
Latin American Regulatory Agencies, in: Journal of Politics in Latin Ameri-
ca, 2, 1, 3–30. 
Landau, D. (2012), The Reality of Social Rights Enforcement, in: Harvard 
International Law Journal, 53, 401–459. 
Landau, D., and J. López (2009), Political Institutions and Judicial Role: An 
Approach in Context, the Case of the Colombian Constitutional Court, 
in: Vniversitas, 119, 55–92. 
Langford, M. (2009), Domestic Adjudication and Economic, Social And 
Cultural Rights: A Socio-Legal Review, in: Sur International Journal of 
Human Rights, 6, 11, 91–122.  
Lemos, M. (2010), The Consequences of Congress’s Choice of Delegate: 
Judicial and Agency Interpretations of Title VII, in: Vanderbilt Law Re-
view, 63, 361–435. 
Levi-Faur, D. (2003), The Politics of Liberalization: Privatization and Regu-
lation-for-Competition in Europe’s and Latin America’s Telecoms and 
Electricity Industries, in: European Journal of Political Research, 42, 705–
740. 
Lodge, M., and L. Stirton (2006), Withering in the Heat?, in: Governance, 19, 
3, 465–495. 
López, J. (2010), El Bloque de Constitucionalidad en su dimensión correcta: 
obligatoriedad de las “interpretaciones autorizadas” (The ‘constitutional 
block’ in its correct dimension: binding character of the ‘authorized in-
terpretations), in: R. Vidal (ed.), Realidades y Tendencias del Derecho en el 
Siglo XXI - Filosofía e Historia del Derecho (Realities and Tendencies of the 
Law in the Twentieth Century – Philosophy and History of Law), Bo-
gotá: Pontificia Universidad Javeriana and Editorial Temis, 233–254. 
López, J., and L. García (2008), La Obligación de Progresividad de los De-
rechos Económicos, Sociales y Culturales: el caso de los Servicios Pú-
blicos en Colombia (The Obligation of Progressive Realization of Eco-
nomic, Social and Cultural Rights: The Case of the Colombian Hou-
sehold Services), in: International Law. Revista Colombiana de Derecho Inter-
nacional, 12, 217–252. 
Majone, G. (1997), From the Positive to the Regulatory State: Causes and 
Consequences of Changes in the Mode of Governance, in: Journal of 
Public Policy, 17, 2, 139–168. 
 128 Julián Daniel López-Murcia 
Majone, G. (1999), The regulatory state and its legitimacy problems, in: West 
European Politics, 22, 1, 1–24. 
Mashaw, J. (2007), Agency-Centered or Court-Centered Administrative Law 
– A Dialogue with Richard Pierce on Agency Statutory Interpretation, 
in: Administrative Law Review, 59, 889–904. 
McCubbins, M., R. G. Noll, and B. R. Weingast (1987), Administrative Pro-
cedures as Instruments of Political Control, in: Journal of Law, Economics 
and Organisation, 3, 2, 243–286. 
McVea, H. (2005), Financial Services Regulation under the Financial Ser-
vices Authority: A Reassertion of the Market Failure Thesis?, in: Cam-
bridge Law Journal, 64, 413–448. 
Nieto, R. (2011), El valor jurídico de las recomendaciones de los Comités de 
Derechos Humanos y el bloque de constitucionalidad (The Legal Value 
of the Recommendations of Human Rights Committees and the Con-
stitutional Block), in: International Law. Revista Colombiana de Derecho Inter-
nacional, 18, 155–190. 
Padgett, S. (1992), The Politics of Nuclear Regulation, in: K. Dyson (ed.), 
The Politics of German Regulation, Aldershot: Dartmouth Publishing Com-
pany Limited, 185-208  
Palacios, H. (1999), El Derecho de los Servicios Públicos (The Public Utilities Law), 
Bogotá: Derecho Vigente.  
Peltzman, S. (1989), The Economic Theory of Regulation after a Decade of 
Deregulation, in: Brookings Papers on Economic Activity (Microeconomics), 1–
44, online: <www.brookings.edu/about/projects/bpea/papers/1989/ 
economic-theory-of-regulation-peltzman> (20 July 2013). 
Piore, M. (2011), Beyond Markets: sociology, street-level bureaucracy and 
the management of the public sector, in: Regulation & Governance, 5, 
145–164. 
Prosser, T. (2010), The Regulatory Enterprise: Government, Regulation and Legitima-
cy, New York: Oxford University Press. 
Prosser, T. (2006), Regulation and Social Solidarity, in: Journal of Law and 
Society, 33, 3, 364–387. 
Prosser, T. (1999), Theorising Utility Regulation, in: Modern Law Review, 62, 
2, 196–216. 
Scheppele, K. (2005), Democracy by Judiciary: Or, Why Courts Can be 
More Democratic than Parliaments, in: A. Czarnota, M. Krygier, and 
W. Sadurski (eds), Rethinking the Rule of Law After Communism, Budapest: 
Central European University Press, 25–60. 
Scott, C. (2001), Analysing regulatory space: fragmented resources and insti-
tutional design, in: Public Law, Summer, 329–353. 
 The Overlaps in Colombian Water Regulation 129 
Sepúlveda, M. (2008), Colombia, in: M. Langford (ed.), Social Rights Jurispru-
dence: Emerging Trends in International and Comparative Law, New York: 
Cambridge University Press, 144–162.  
Stern, J. (2010), The Evaluation of Regulatory Agencies, in: R. Baldwin, M. 
Cave, and M. Lodge (eds), The Oxford Handbook of Regulation, New York: 
Oxford University Press, 223–258.  
Stigler, G. (1971), The Theory of Economic Regulation, in: Bell Journal of 
Economics and Management Science, 2, 3, 3–21. 
Sunstein, C. (2006), Chevron Step Zero, in: Virginia Law Review, 92, 187–
249. 
Sunstein, C. (2001), Designing Democracy: What Constitutions Do, New York: 
Oxford University Press.  
Sunstein, C. (1990), After the Rights Revolution: Reconceiving the Regulatory State, 
Cambridge: Harvard University Press. 
Sunstein, C. (1989), Interpreting Statutes in the Regulatory State, in: Harvard 
Law Review, 103, 405–508. 
Thatcher, M. (2007), Internationalisation and Economic Institutions: Comparing the 
European Experience, Oxford: University Press.  
Thatcher, M. (2005), The third force? Independent regulatory agencies and 
elected politicians in Europe, in: Governance, 18, 3, 347–373. 
Thatcher, M. (2002), Delegation to Independent Regulatory Agencies: Pres-
sures, Functions and Contextual Mediation, in: West European Politics, 
25, 1, 125–147. 
Thiruvengadam, A., and P. Joshi (2012), Judiciaries as crucial actors in 
Southern regulatory systems: A case study of Indian telecom regulation, 
in: Regulation & Governance, 6, 327–343. 
Uprimny, R. (2006), The Enforcement of  Social Rights by the Colombian 
Constitutional Court: Cases and Debates, in: R. Gargarella, P. Domin-
go, and T. Roux (eds), Courts and Social Transformation in New Democracies, 
Aldershot/Burlington: Ashgate, 128–131. 
Uprimny, R., and M. García (2002), La reforma a la tutela: ajuste o desmon-
te? (Reforming the tutela: adjusting or dismantling it?), in: Revista de 
Derecho Público, 15, 245–286. 
Urueña, R. (2012), The rise of the constitutional regulatory state in Colom-
bia: The case of water governance, in: Regulation & Governance, 6, 282–
299. 
Vélez, L. (2010), Génesis de la reforma del sector de agua y saneamiento en Colombia 
(Genesis of the water and sanitation sector reform in Colombia), IADB, online: 
<http://idbdocs.iadb.org/wsdocs/getdocument.aspx?docnum=35328 
379> (30 August 2012). 
 130 Julián Daniel López-Murcia 
Wilson, J. Q. (1980), The Politics of Regulation, in: J. Q. Wilson (ed.), The 
Politics of Regulation, New York: Basic Books, 357–394.  
Colombia  
Comisión de Regulación de Agua Potable y Saneamiento Básico de la Repú-
blica de Colombia (Water and Sanitation Regulatory Commission) 
(2011), Regulación Integral del Sector de Agua Potable y Saneamiento 
Básico (Comprehensive Water and Sanitation Regulation), online: 
<http://cra.gov.co/apc-aa-files/323839333830366132316362366233 
36/compilacionCRA.pdf> (30 August 2012). 
Constitution, online: <www.secretariasenado.gov.co/senado/basedoc/cp/ 
constitucion_politica_1991.html#1> (30 August 2012). 
CRA see Comisión de Regulación de Agua Potable y Saneamiento Básico de 
la República de Colombia 
Decreto 2152 de 1992 (Decree 2152 of 1992), online: <www.presidencia. 
gov.co/prensa_new/decretoslinea/1992/diciembre/30/dec215230199
2.pdf> (30 August 2012). 
Decreto 064 de 2012 (Decree 064 of 2012), online: <www.alcaldiabogota. 
gov.co/sisjur/normas/Norma1.jsp?i=45989> (30 August 2012). 
Ley 142 de 1994 (Law 142 of 1994), online: <www.secretariasenado.gov.co/ 
senado/basedoc/ley/1994/ley_0142_1994.html> (30 August 2012). 
Case Law  
Corte Constitutional (Constitutional Court of Colombia), sentencias (rulings) 
T-406 of 1992, T-578 of 1992, T-380 of 1994, T-092 of 1995, T-481 of 
1997, T-270 of 2007, T-888 of 2008, T-381 of 2009, T-091 de 2010, T-
614 of 2010, C-220 of 2011, T-273 of 2012, T-525 of 2012, online: 
<www.corteconstitucional.gov.co/relatoria/> (30 August 2012). 
International Bodies
UN Commission on Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights, General Com-
ment No. 15, The right to water (arts. 11 and 12 of the International 
Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights), (Twenty-ninth 
session, 2002), UN Doc. E/C.12/2002/11.  
 The Overlaps in Colombian Water Regulation 131 
Interviews
Rubén Darío Avendaño, former public official at the National Planning 
Agency who worked on the draft Public Utilities Statute, former CRA 
commissioner and current director of institutional relations at Empre-
sas Públicas de Medellín (Public Utilities of Medellin), interview 18 July 
2012.  
Alfredo Bateman, subsecretary of economic development of Bogotá, inter-
view 23 July 2012.  
Marina Montes, legal director of the SSPD, interview 19 April 2012. 
Hugo Palacios, external advisor who prepared the draft Public Utilities Stat-
ute and current managing partner of the leading Colombian law firm in 
public utilities regulation, interview 4 February 2012.  
Nilson Pinilla, current justice of the Colombian Constitutional Court, inter-
view 5 September 2012.  
Three of the four current CRA commissioners, interviews 3 April, 5 June 
and 12 June 2012.  
 
 
 
 
Agencias Regulatorias y Cortes en el Sur: las Superposiciones en la 
Regulación Colombiana del Agua  
Resumen: ¿Cómo podemos explicar el surgimiento y desarrollo de las su-
perposiciones entre la Comisión de Regulación de Agua Potable y Sanea-
miento Básico (CRA) de Colombia y la Corte Constitucional? Este artículo 
muestra las limitaciones de la literatura dominante para explicar estas super-
posiciones. En contraste, argumento que la “empresa regulatoria” desarro-
llada por Tony Prosser (2010) y el “isomorfismo institucional” explicado por 
DiMaggio y Powell (1991) están mejor equipados para ofrecer explicaciones 
plausibles. Adicionalmente, mi hipótesis es que la falta de entendimiento de 
las diferencias entre el rol de una agencia regulatoria en países desarrollados 
y el rol de una agencia regulatoria en Colombia es crítico en estas superposi-
ciones. Las condiciones específicas que determinan estas diferencias son una 
legislatura precaria, una Constitución “gruesa” que incluye varios derechos 
sociales y una implementación judicial activista de estos derechos. Esta in-
vestigación cualitativa no permite llegar a conclusiones generalizables. Sin 
embargo, la intención de este estudio es proporcionar algunas ideas sobre el 
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rol y los retos específicos para una agencia regulatoria en países en desarro-
llo. Adicionalmente, este caso de estudio busca demostrar que los investiga-
dores de la regulación deben enfocarse en el contexto político para poder 
desarrollar herramientas apropiadas para evaluar las agencias regulatorias 
fuera del mundo desarrollado.  
Palabras clave: Colombia, racionalidades regulatorias, empresa regulatoria, 
isomorfismo institucional, agencia regulatoria, derecho al agua 
